FM-3-81 Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Download

Page 64 of 188

Chapter 3 3-6 FM 3-81 09 November 2021 SUPPORT AREA CONSIDERATIONS 3-10. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities. This section uses the operations process activities (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) to discuss considerations that are important to conducting support area operations. The primary considerations of commanders and their staff are the positioning, employment, and protection of assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. Note. The MEB is an integral part of corps and division ability to command and control in support areas. The mobilization and deployment of the MEB must be prioritized in planning and operations to ensure that it arrives as early as possible. Depending on the situation, corps and division commanders may consider deploying their assigned MEB ahead of their divisional combat power. PLAN 3-11. Corps and division planners must analyze METT-TC to determine what capabilities and units the MEB needs to successfully accomplish the support area mission. A troop-to-task analysis must be done during mission analysis to determine the required capabilities. The corps or division commander must then assess the level of risk and allocate resources to MEB. In some tactical situations, the corps or division commander may accept risk in the support area, but then plan to apportion additional combat power to the support area to improve the tactical situation throughout the AO. 3-12. The placement of support areas is influenced by enemy threats. To increase their survivability, support areas are generally placed out of range of the majority of the enemy’s indirect-fire systems to increase their survivability when possible. However, security considerations must be balanced with maintaining responsiveness units conducting close and deep operations. Figure 3-3 provides a notional example of depths and frontages of the operational area. Below are general considerations for minimum distances for establishing corps and division support areas behind the forward line of troops: The division support area extends from 29 to 36 kilometers behind the forward line of troops. The corps support area extends from 70 to 90 kilometers behind the forward line of troops, or 40 to 60 kilometers behind the division support areas. Note. Corps and division planners must ensure that supporting sustainment units (especially fuel, water, and ammunition) are positioned no further than 90 kilometers from the support area during operations demanding high operating tempo and movement. This can be extremely critical when conducting offensive operations and maintaining combat power against the enemy. Poor terrain or weather conditions may reduce the distance.