FM-3-09 Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations Download
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Appendix D D-16 FM 3-09 30 April 2020 D-108. Position area selection, positioning on rocky soil away from roads reduces the dust hazard during air assault operations. Sandy deserts may be a problem for some towed artillery and mortars. Solid ground to secure some firing systems' platforms or baseplates and spades may be rare in certain areas. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT D-109. Air support aircraft may be more vulnerable because of the lack of covered approaches. Suppression of enemy air defenses is very important. However, the greater visibility common in most deserts allows target engagement from better standoff ranges. D-110. Detailed planning for close air support is important because of wide dispersion of units. Marker panels or other visual or electronic signatures are required to help the pilot differentiate between friend and foe. SECTION V – NIGHT OPERATIONS D-111. Some specific reasons for night combat include: To achieve surprise and to avoid heavy losses that might be incurred in daylight operations over the same terrain. To compensate for advantages held by an enemy with superior forces or air superiority. To counter the enemy night operations. To retain the initiative or freedom of action. To exploit the technological advantage of our forces at night over a less sophisticated enemy. D-112. Movement and land navigation are more difficult at night. This is largely because of problems with terrain recognition. If navigation aids such as GPS equipment is not available, maintaining direction while moving is extremely difficult at night. D-113. Target acquisition and engagement ranges are limited to the capabilities of night vision devices. Controlling the direct fires is critical at night. Control requires effective communications to ensure engagement of the correct targets. FIRE SUPPORT D-114. The main consideration in supporting night combat with FA, mortars, tactical aircraft, and naval gunfire is the ability to detect the target and coordinate the attack. Illumination and smoke assets probably will be in short supply. If their use is critical to the success of an operation, the FSCOORD must know the specific area in which the commander desires to use smoke and illumination and for what purpose. Plan smoke at night to degrade enemy night vision capabilities. If too little ammunition is available, take action to alleviate the shortfall well in advance. D-115. At night, the adjustment of fires without the aid of radars, artificial illumination, or sound ranging is virtually impossible. If adjustment of fires on critical targets is required, do it during daylight if possible. If not possible to adjust the target during daylight, allocate target acquisition assets for adjustment of fires. D-116. The FSCOORD plays a critical role if CAS, UAS, or attack helicopters are used in night operations. These weapon platforms may not be equipped with adequate night vision equipment. Their effectiveness will depend on the ability of the force to illuminate targets. Additional coordination between the FSCOORD, maneuver G-3, G-3 air, and ALO is needed to integrate sorties and plan illumination for their use. NIGHT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS D-117. In planning a night attack, the commander must decide what type of attack to conduct. Their decision is based on the required FS. D-118. Illuminated and non-illuminated attacks. An illuminated attack is used when the possibility of achieving surprise is remote, when the enemy has night vision devices, and where control of units overrides the need for stealth.