FM-3-09 Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations Download
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Appendix C C-2 FM 3-09 30 April 2020 C-7. Unit TTP and SOPs for maintenance related work arounds vary by the type of equipment and the nature of the fault. Self-locating howitzers are able to reciprocally lay with another howitzer in order to maintain firing capability, while a radar system may have to rely on another system to fill its mission while the fault is being repaired. THE THREAT TO GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS C-8. One of the greatest threats is a persistent disruption of the GPS affecting precision, navigation, and timing in operations. Timing, especially for secure communications, can be controlled by the net control station and pushed to subordinate radios. Units must ensure they load the proper communications security (referred to as COMSEC) into their GPS systems to help prevent degradations in the signal quality and provide the most accurate data possible. C-9. There are multiple technologies and techniques that can be utilized to improve GPS operations when jamming occurs. The best solution is to use anti jamming equipment if available. If anti jamming equipment is unavailable, block the signal by placing a barrier (for example, your body) between the device and the suspected source of jamming. If using your body, slowly pivot 90 degrees every two minutes until the signal is regained. The EMI emitter is then behind you. Alternatively, the receiver can be placed in a hole six inches deep. A vehicle hatch may be used as a hole. Allow two minutes for the device to acquire the signal. If neither of these techniques resolve the issue; move. The emitter is too close for mitigating techniques to have any effect. C-10. FA systems are capable of operating in a GPS denied environment. Units must be prepared and trained to execute their mission using INS, maps, aiming circles and compass when necessary. THE THREAT TO NETWORK CONNECTIVITY C-11. Enemy CEMA can disrupt the network affecting key means of communications. Units must ensure they have an adequate PACE plan. Ensure it is known and rehearsed at all organizational levels in order to maintain communications and firing capability as long as possible. C-12. Digital communications is the primary means for transmitting fire commands. If digital communication is lost or degraded it must be reestablished as soon as possible. Degraded digital communication uses the AFATDS purely as a technical fire direction computer and the FDC personnel would transmit the fire command by voice. If one howitzer in the battery or platoon loses digital communications, the FDC will issue voice commands to that howitzer or the howitzer can fire data from an adjacent section. If two or more howitzers or launchers lose digital communications, the FDC may direct all howitzers or launchers to use degraded mode. The howitzers or launchers can then take fire commands by voice only. To facilitate voice commands, the FDC provides the fire command standards to the section chief after occupation of the position. C-13. If digital communication are denied or degraded with the supported maneuver element, fire missions, fire plans, FSCMs, and any other data can be transmitted by voice. If voice communications are not possible courier or liaison personnel can be utilized. TRAINING FOR DENIED, DEGRADED, AND DISRUPTED OPERATIONS C-14. Realistic training combined with increased repetitions will improve our leaders and Soldiers ability to manage operational contingencies and maintain firing capability. Being able to continue to fight while under D3SOE conditions is an extremely perishable skill and should be trained as a regular part of a unit's annual cyclic training and certifications. Units must train under D3SOE conditions to include: CBRN. D3SOE networks. D3SOE positioning. Navigation and timing. D3SOE fire control and fire direction systems. D3SOE precision fires.