FM-3-09 Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations Download
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30 April 2020 FM 3-09 C-1 Appendix C Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Operations To effectively operate in denied, degraded, and disrupted environments Commanders must drive training conditions based on the expected conditions in the OE. This chapter is an example on how to plan for and train to maintain firing capabilities when all capabilities are not fully functional. Section I describes the types of degraded conditions. Section II describes the five requirements for accurate predicted fire during degraded, disrupted or denied operations. SECTION I – TYPES OF DENIED, DEGRADED, AND DISRUPTED CONDITIONS C-1. The TTP required to conduct denied, degraded, and disrupted operations are perishable skills. It is imperative that unit leaders institute training programs to conduct operations under all conditions in order to maintain proficiency, and sustain the FS systems ability to continuously support maneuver operations. C-2. As we become more reliant on technology to perform operational tasks, we also become more susceptible to single points of failures within our system of systems. To counter this we must be prepared to fight without technology. To ensure organizations can maintain full mission capability in degraded operations, proper planning and rehearsals at all organizational levels are essential to ensure FS for maneuver forces within the OE. Denied, degraded, or disrupted space operational environment is a composite of those conditions and influences in which space-enabled capabilities have been impaired by hostile threats or non- hostile means (FM 3-14). THE THREAT TO COMMUNICATIONS C-3. Enemies and adversaries may seek to contest the use of the information environment as a means of denying operational access and diminishing the capability of the US and multinational forces. The ability to perform C2 and communicate with globally deployed forces is a key enabler for protection of US national interests and, as such, is also a key target for adversaries. C-4. Enemies and adversaries may deliberately attempt to deny friendly use of the EMS, space, cyberspace, and terrestrial systems. Due to our heavy joint reliance on advanced communications systems, such an attack may be a central element of any enemy or adversary A2 and AD strategy, requiring a higher degree of protection for friendly C2 systems and planning for operations in a denied or degraded environment (JP 6- 0). C-5. Peer and near-peer adversaries have demonstrated capabilities in hybrid OEs that threaten the Army's dominance in cyberspace and the EMS. Communications are a key enabler, therefore communication and information networks present a high-value target for enemies and adversaries. Our peer threats understand the extent of U.S. forces' reliance on satellite communication systems. Enemies and adversaries will contest the information environment to deny operational access and diminish the effectiveness of our forces. MAINTENANCE OR SYSTEM FAULT C-6. Another possible reason to operate degraded is because a piece of automated fire control system temporarily goes down for a maintenance related issue. Unit level TTP, battle drills, and SOPs can allow the units to reciprocally lay a howitzer, transfer the howitzer or launchers to another FDC, or switch to a backup piece of fire control equipment. All in order to maintain fires and TA capability.