ATP-5-0-2-1 Staff Reference Guide Volume 1 Download
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Appendix L 344 ATP 5-0.2-1 07 December 2020 Authorities. L-5. When joint and host-nation security forces can realistically maintain a reduced level of violence, the transition to stability occurs. At this time, the commander begins the transition to stability operations to increase the capability of host-nation forces and local governance to operate without assistance. L-6. Unlike combat operations, stability operations most likely bring Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians into direct contact with host-nation forces and the populace. In planning for these interactions, public affairs and legal advisors train forces extensively. Increased interaction brings increased need for additional services such as translators, contracting, and finance. End state goals of stability operations are— Safe and secure environment. Established rule of law. Social well-being. Stable governance. Sustainable economy. L-7. With stability operations, protection forces are needed to process detainees and to reduce the resurgence of large-scale violence. Combined arms units will likely be required to conduct stability operations. Flexibility in the plan to account for setbacks, unanticipated advances, and contingencies is essential. Units must also be able to conduct non-standard roles when conducting stability operations. Artillery units may be required to conduct infantry training and tasks in support of stability operations. Protection forces may be required to accompany contracted host-nation convoys and perform primarily contracting officer representative tasks. Logistics units may be required to conduct training to units that do not speak English. Financial and engineer assets may be required to conduct assessments in support of State Department personnel. L-8. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). They are used when developing an operational approach. They are— Compel—using, or threatening to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control—imposing civil order. Influence—altering the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign, friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy targets and audiences through messages, presence, and actions. Support—establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively. L-9. A plan for stability operations is built on lines of effort (LOEs) with end states rather than on specified objectives. LOEs account for a reliance on host-nation advances rather than that of U.S. forces. Host-nation forces (during stability operations) are typically less capable of unilateral offensive operations and take varying periods of time to conduct unilateral operations in their own defense. U.S. forces are reliant on host nation progress for transition to local authorities. Commanders generally resist committing forces or resources that do not contribute to the LOE. Planners must clearly explain the need for committing forces or resources to a task in support of an LOE. Figure L-1 depicts an LOE development model.