ATP-3-94-2 HIMARS Deep Operations Download

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Appendix B B-8 ATP 3-94.2 1 September 2016 REHEARSALS B-50. The integration of combined arms requires synchronization to increase the effectiveness of the operation and reduce the probability of fratricide. Effective rehearsals imprint a mental picture of the sequence of the operation’s key actions and improve mutual understanding and coordination of subordinate and supporting leaders and units. The extent of rehearsals depends on available time; however, they must be conducted. PLANS-TO-OPERATIONS TRANSITION B-51. The transition of the plan to operations is critical to ensure successful execution and enable proper battle tracking. During this time, the responsibility for developing and maintaining the plan shifts from the planning cell to the current operations integration cell. It ensures members of the COIC fully understand the plan before execution. The transition briefing enables members of the COIC to understand the upcoming operation as well as identify friction points and issues to solve prior to execution. TASK ORGANIZATION B-52. During preparation, commanders organize their forces in accordance with command and support relationships outlined in the plan. This ensures adequate time to brief and rehearse the operation as a team to ensure a mutual understanding of the operation. GO/NO-GO BRIEF B-53. The go/no-go brief verifies the conditions are set for the successful execution of the operation. Based on the mission variables and the acceptable levels of risk, the commander determines what considerations are selected as go/no-go criteria. The staff confirms or denies the status of each criteria during the brief. The go/no-go brief should occur early enough to allow participating forces enough time to complete final preparations and mobilization. For example, the go/no-go decision for a deep operation oriented on a moving enemy force should accommodate aircraft run up, mission systems initialization, line-up procedures, and enroute flight time to the EA prior to the enemy force vacating the EA. Refer to Table 3-1, for an example go/no-go brief outlined by warfighting function. EXECUTION B-54. Execution translates decisions into actions, and deep operations often require detailed synchronization to ensure that the correct timing of actions occurs. During planning and preparation, the commander and staff identify milestones in the execution that assist in maintaining control by triggering another planned action. As the staff monitors and assesses the progression of the deep operation, they continuously update running estimates, analyze the operational priorities, and synchronize assets and efforts based on their original plan, required deviations, and available resources. TRIGGERS B-55. A trigger is an enemy or friendly action that initiates a planned response. Triggers drive the execution of deliberate attacks. For example, an enemy armored force that maneuvers into a named area of interest may trigger an attack reconnaissance company to depart the holding area to occupy attack by fire positions oriented on an EA. The initiation of SEAD may be triggered when the attack reconnaissance company crosses the FLOT enroute to the EA. B-56. The execution of an air assault operation is time driven or event driven. Final coordination times for an air assault operation are synchronized between the executing air assault unit and the supported ground unit. An example trigger event for an air assault operation would be the completion of a successful deception operation in another part of the AO. The event shifts the enemy's focus and security away from the air assault objective.