ATP-3-09-42 Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team Download
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Chapter 3 3-24 ATP 3-09.42 1 March 2016 Planning electronic warfare assets to defeat the improvised explosive device threat, disrupt enemy information collection (see the discussion in chapter 4 and FM 3-55), reconnaissance and surveillance efforts, and detect the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum for targeting purposes. A threat may interpret the use of nonlethal activities as our reluctance to use force. This may embolden the enemy to adopt courses of action otherwise not considered. Some nonlethal activities may have unintended adverse effects on the local population. This may arouse adverse public opinion. The targeting working group and targeting board must synchronize the use of nonlethal activities. URBAN OPERATIONS GUIDE SHEETS 3-134. The guide sheets in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 on page 3-25 are designed to help the FSCOORD, fires cell planners and the field artillery battalion S-3 plan for urban operations. The tables are provided only as guides and may not address all the items applicable to specific situations. Table 3-1. BCT fire support planners urban operations guide sheet • Are the urban operations part of a larger operation, requiring consideration of other fire support requirements and phase transitioning? What are the rules of engagement (indirect and small arms fire)? What are the size and the affiliation of the civilian population? Will a major civilian exodus need to be considered? Is potential civilian sabotage a significant problem? • What buildings and areas have been designated as protected and have some type of applicable restriction concerning fires, and the use or emplacement of field artillery units in their vicinity been identified? • What fire support considerations must be taken into account for identified areas with major hazardous waste potential? Have underground and above ground electric, fuel, gas, and water lines and storage tanks, hubs, or generating facilities been located? • How does the general construction of buildings and roads differ within the area of operations and what are the fire support implications? • What FSCMs have been, or need to be, established? What specific BCT commander’s attack guidance is needed to address key fire support restrictions and considerations? How do minimum safe distances need to be adjusted to allow for urban operations conditions and the possibility of secondary explosions? • What is the scheme of maneuver? How will front line traces be reported (grid or reference numbers)? How often must forward line of own troops reports be given? • What maps, sketches, and building/block numbering systems are maneuver forces using to control movement and clearing operations? Do observers, fires cells, and indirect fires units have copies, as necessary? Is a common datum possible? See ATTP 3-06.11. • How will restrictive fire lines be used in urban small team and brigade-level combat? • Has each fire support task been reviewed to ensure that primary and backup triggering observers can view the target and that primary and backup firing units can adequately attack the target from anticipated positions? • Have visibility and masking diagrams been prepared and analyzed to identify dead space and urban areas that may interfere with ground and air attack, observation, and target acquisition assets? Has coordination taken place with the particular element to verify analysis and address implications? • What adjustments have been made and must be made to clearance of fire procedures? Are required radar zones supportable from anticipated radar positions? How much and when will masking interfere with radar support? • Is there any critical terrain necessary for firing or target acquisition elements that must be taken and cleared by maneuver forces to execute any fire support tasks? • Have anticipated fire support tasks involving direct fire been identified and coordinated with the supporting field artillery battalion? Have movement plans and security for direct fire field artillery elements been planned and rehearsed in adequate detail? • How well has the enemy been able to harden positions and reinforce buildings? What are the firing and ammunition implications? • Has targeting involved a 3-dimensional analysis? When and where may below-ground locations (such as basements or subways) and rooftops or multistoried structures present critical fire support issues? • Is the echelons above BCT threat higher or lower in the anticipated urban operations situation? What is the assessment of risk? • What are the implications for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft? What areas may not be appropriate for air attacks? • How will air tactics need to differ for the particular urban operations situations anticipated? What are the