ATP-3-09-42 Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team Download
Page 79 of 308
Fire Support for Tactical Enabling and Other Tasks 1 March 2016 ATP 3-09.42 3-23 CONTROL 3-128. Artillery may be placed under a maneuver commander’s tactical control for distributed operations. This control is not of just a weapon, but a system, so the howitzers should be controlled through maneuver battalion fires cells because the respective FSO knows the capabilities and limitations of the system. For example, a platoon of three guns may be given a command or support relationship with a company. The company commander then has the option to control the system as a company support-by-fire asset or to place the system in support of the platoon leader requiring the direct fire support. The company commander may designate a platoon to isolate the objective through a support-by-fire mission. The howitzer system would receive its fire commands from the infantry platoon leader that is given the mission. Control of the howitzer system does not normally go below platoon level. In a similar manner, a battery may be given a command or support relationship with a maneuver battalion. COUNTERFIRE 3-129. Counterfire is difficult in urban environments. Masking can degrade the performance of radars. It will be more difficult for air and ground observers to locate enemy artillery by visual, sound, and flash methods. Radar sites must be carefully selected. If radars are sited too close behind tall buildings, they will be masked and lose some effectiveness. High terrain outside the urban area should be considered, when possible. Counterfire ammunition requirements may increase if the enemy effectively uses buildings and available materials to harden and camouflage those positions. However counterfire may be limited by the rules of engagement and fear of collateral damage. AIR AND ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT 3-130. Air and Army aviation support is an important aspect of BCT urban operations. Although air- delivered fires from manned and unmanned fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft can positively and directly affect the conduct of BCT actions in the urban area, the ability of aircraft to provide fires may be limited by the structural makeup of the urban location. Fire support planners should consider the use of supporting aircraft to observe, call for, and adjust indirect fires, and report battle damage assessment. 3-131. Air interdiction can be a vital component of shaping operations in urban terrain. Often, air interdiction of the avenues of approach into the urban area isolates the threat by diverting, disrupting, delaying, or destroying threat forces before they can be used effectively against the BCT. Air interdiction is especially effective in major theater war circumstances where restrictions on airpower are limited and the threat is likely to be a conventionally equipped enemy. In addition to shaping and dominating the urban operation through firepower, the BCT commander can use aviation support capabilities to improve and augment the urban transportation and distribution infrastructure. For more on aviation support to urban operations see ATP 3-06.1. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FIRE SUPPORT 3-132. United States (U.S.) Navy and U.S. Marine Corps fire support organizations are described in ADRP 3-09 and FM 3-09. See also chapter 4 of this ATP. NONLETHAL ACTIVITIES 3-133. Aspects of cyber electromagnetic activities (such as electronic attack) and information operations (such as artillery- or air-delivered military information support operations leaflets) are not designed specifically to minimize fatalities, but they may be used with the same intent. Nonlethal activities can help the BCT commander maintain the desired balance between protection, mission accomplishment, and the safety of noncombatants by expanding the number of options available when the use of deadly force poses problems. In determining nonlethal capabilities use and employment, the BCT commander should consider risk, threat perspective, legal, ethical, and environmental concerns, and public opinion: The use of nonlethal activities in situations where lethal force is more appropriate may drastically increase the risk to BCT personnel.