ATP-3-09-42 Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team Download
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Fire Support for Tactical Enabling and Other Tasks 1 March 2016 ATP 3-09.42 3-21 or enemy positions in reinforced concrete buildings. Concrete-piercing 155-mm rounds can penetrate 36 inches of concrete at ranges up to 2,200 meters. If care is taken, self-propelled artillery can be used to clear or create avenues of approach. Due to the self-propelled howitzer’s limited armor protection, infantry will be required to provide security from enemy snipers and antitank teams. 3-111. Although towed artillery can be used in a direct fire role, it is not preferred because it does not have any ballistic crew protection. This lack of protection should not preclude the use of towed artillery if the situation calls for it and the commander is willing to accept increased risk of crew casualties. For some direct fire situations, the light 105-mm howitzer may be more adaptable especially for fires against dismounted infantry on streets or in open areas. Other direct fire considerations include adequate communications, protection and positions. A dedicated radio frequency for the controlling maneuver headquarters speaking directly to the howitzer section is necessary to control fires and prevent fratricide. 3-112. A Bradley fighting vehicle and a squad of dismounted mechanized infantry, or a squad of light infantry with anti-armor weapons should protect each howitzer, regardless of weapon type. The infantry must provide local security and prevent enemy ground assault, sniper fire, and antitank fire (for example, rocket-propelled grenades). 3-113. The infantry must reconnoiter and occupy positions where the howitzer can provide fire support. These positions must be free from enemy direct fire, but still allow direct fire by the howitzer on the target. Although self-propelled artillery systems seem formidable, they provide less crew protection than the Bradley fighting vehicle, and they contain large amounts of onboard ammunition and propellant. Self- propelled howitzers are susceptible to catastrophic destruction by heavy automatic weapons, light cannon field artillery, and antitank fire. The howitzer should provide the necessary support and then move to an alternate position to avoid being identified by the enemy. Overwatching infantry should always move ahead of and with the howitzer to prevent enemy ambushes. POSITIONING AND MOVEMENT 3-114. The urban area may affect the positioning of artillery. Sufficient space may not exist to place battery or platoon positions with the proper unmasked gun line. This may mandate moving and positioning artillery in sections while still massing fires on specific targets. Commanders protect artillery systems, particularly when task organized into small sections. Threats to artillery include raids and snipers. Therefore, firing units will have to place increased emphasis on securing their positions. 3-115. Use of observation posts and listening posts is more important, as terrain allows the enemy to infiltrate and get closer to artillery positions. Personnel in the open or in vehicles moving through restricted areas are particularly exposed to fires from snipers in tall buildings. 3-116. Field artillery should be positioned outside of town on the edge of the urban area, if possible. Existing structures should be used to harden positions. Barns and other large buildings can be occupied for concealment of weapons and equipment. Units should also be aware of the dangers presented by overhead and underground power lines, gas and water pipelines, and similar hazards, especially when combined with the danger of enemy counterfire. 3-117. When placement in the urban area is necessary, howitzer positions among buildings should, at a minimum, allow for high-angle firing. Masking should be minimized. Positioning of indirect fire assets is difficult because of the predominance of concrete surfaces. Spades can be emplaced against a curb or base plates can be sandbagged if ground is not suitable for normal emplacement. 3-118. Airports, parks, athletic fields, and such may offer good firing positions. Cultivated fields may be too soft and muddy for use. 3-119. Reconnaissance is more difficult. Armed reconnaissance parties may need to clear an area physically before occupation is possible. Maneuver or military police assistance may be required. 3-120. Range requirements must be considered. Counterfire targets outside the urban area may be difficult to range from positions in the city needed for high-angle, close-supporting fires. Firing positions outside the urban area that allow excellent low-angle fires may be too distant to range counterfire targets on the far side of the city. Supplementary positions may be needed for counterfire and other missions.