ATP-3-09-42 Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team Download
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Fire Support for Tactical Enabling and Other Tasks  1 March 2016 ATP 3-09.42 3-17  enemy positions. Also, restrictive FSCMs, such as RFAs and NFAs (see FM 3-09), are needed to protect  civilians and identified restricted areas.  3-84. Identifying and anticipating kill zones or engagement areas is critical to ensuring that indirect fire  assets are in position to provide supporting fires. Practically, the ability and the utility of massed fires is  affected in an urban environment. The natural restrictions in place due to the obstructive nature of urban  terrain and the small-unit operations prevalent in urban combat require an innovative and limited approach  to the delivery of fires. However, major road networks that offer high-speed avenues of approach into and  through an area are suitable for targeting to restrict the flow of enemy forces and supplies into the combat  area.  3-85. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (see ATP 2-01.3 and ATP 2-19.4) leads to the identification  of time-sensitive high-payoff targets and is an important consideration for the BCT FSCOORD and fires  cell planners. The BCT commander or higher headquarters normally provides specific targeting guidance  and prioritization for time-sensitive targets (see ATP 3-60.1) within the BCT’s area of operations.  FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES  3-86. Fratricide prevention is a matter of concern in all operations. The risk of fratricide is much greater  when visual identification and precise navigation are inhibited, by either distance or reduced visibility. In  urban operations, the very nature of the physical terrain creates a situation of reduced visibility, resulting in  unique and significant challenges to combat identification and fratricide prevention. The challenge is the  need to minimize fratricide without unreasonably restricting the BCT’s ability to accomplish its mission.  3-87. There are two basic causes of urban fratricide—procedural and technical. Procedural causes are  typically failures of fire support coordination. Technical failures may include failures of controlling  equipment or mechanical malfunctions.  WEAPONS EFFECTS  3-88. Because the conduct and coordination of indirect fires in urban areas is difficult, fires in support of  the maneuvering elements is closely coordinated and planned in detail. Planning and coordination includes  considerations of force protection, weapons effects, psychological effects on the populace, and the potential  for collateral damage (see chapter 2). For air-delivered munitions, terminal control (see chapter 4) and  positive guidance are required to ensure the delivering platform has acquired the correct target. Effective  airspace coordinating measures (ACM) (see FM 3-52) can ensure other missions (for example, strike  coordination and reconnaissance missions) can transit or operate in the airspace above and around the urban  area.  3-89. The effects of lethal munitions can be significantly different in urban environments. The  characteristics of the urban terrain and the small unit house-to-house nature of urban combat affect both the  results and employment of weapons. Specific weapons effects considerations for urban operations include  the risk estimate distance and quantity of the munitions, the construction of the building(s), and the ability  to engage the target.  3-90. Calculated risk estimate distances are often not valid in urban operations. Buildings provide cover  that can reduce blast and shell fragment effects risk distances to a few meters. Inaccurate or stray fires may  occur due to projectiles deflecting off buildings, wires, or other objects. Bomblets, scatterable mines,  illumination, and other ordnance payloads may also be diverted by objects or may have irregular patterns  due to swirling upper- or lower-level winds around large or tall structures.  TARGET ACQUISITION AND OBSERVATION CONSIDERATIONS  3-91. Urban military operations are involved with physical terrain, noncombatants, and infrastructure.  Urban combat almost always will affect all three in greater or lesser degree, and the lethal and collateral  effects of fires have the potential for great destruction and loss of life. In order to maximize desired effects  of fires on the threat while at the same time minimizing undesired adverse effects on the built-up area and  its inhabitants, these fires must often be as precise as technology and planning will allow.