ATP-3-09-42 Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team Download
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Chapter 3 3-4 ATP 3-09.42 1 March 2016 FIRE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR AREA AND LOCAL SECURITY 3-13. Fire support considerations for area and local security operations are similar to those for the brigade support area. See Joint Publication (JP) 3-10 for details on threat levels. Fire Support Considerations for the Brigade Support Area 3-14. Field artillery and attack aviation (when available), with their ability to rapidly provide responsive fires, are key to defeating enemy actions in the brigade support area while preserving the integrity of ground combat forces for decisive and shaping operations. 3-15. The principles of fire support planning and coordination in brigade support areas do not differ significantly from those in the forward areas. There is, however, a difference in the facilities available. Command posts in brigade support areas may have only limited manpower and limited communications facilities. 3-16. The FSCOORD and fire cell planners should plan the use of any available assets such as mortars and combat aviation that can be on-call or re-tasked. Attack helicopters and fixed-wing close air support can rapidly respond and, because of the ability of the aircrews of these aircraft to better discriminate between enemy targets and friendly forces, may reduce the likelihood of fratricide. 3-17. With few exceptions, field artillery assets are not be employed against a Level I threat or against Level II threat forces that can be defeated by base or base cluster units or by the reaction force. However, enemy forces of battalion size or larger that could comprise a Level III threat are of sufficient size and capability to warrant the employment of indirect fire, Army aviation, or air support assets against them. 3-18. The forces already on station are initially responsible for fighting the threat to the brigade support area. The immediate problem for brigade support area operations is how to manipulate the limited resources, including fire support, in order to apply them at the right time and place. Considerations that affect the application of fire support for brigade support area operations include: The reduction of fire support for the decisive or shaping operations; field artillery units positioned to provide fires to the brigade support area may not be able to provide fires for the main and supporting efforts. Weather effects on the employment of weapon systems and joint fire support assets. The suitability of fire support as determined by the overall tactical situation. Counterfire coverage of the brigade support area. Weather effects on the employment of weapon systems and joint fire support assets. The responsiveness of the available weapon systems. The precision capability and the collateral damage effects of the weapon systems. The existence of communications networks to facilitate fire support activities. The availability of observers to identify targets and adjust fires. A dedicated source to conduct calls for fire must have eyes on the target. Aerial observers from the combat aviation brigade, capable of directing artillery, attack aviation, and joint fire support assets are often the best observers against brigade support area threats. Clearance for fires into the brigade support area must be obtained; the BCT S-3 must rapidly deconflict who owns the ground and coordinate unit positioning, routes and activities. 3-19. Due to the risk of fratricide, the applicable fire support coordination measures (FSCM) for brigade support area operations are typically restrictive measures such as RFAs. When such FSCMs are needed, the FSCOORD and BCT fires cell planners, should recommend them for approval by the BCT commander. 3-20. The procedures for establishing FSCMs in the brigade support area must become part of the overall planning process. Forces employed to deal with a Level III force in the brigade support area normally are given an area of operations. 3-21. The establishment of a boundary within the brigade support area and the possible addition of a task force FSO to the responding reaction force require close coordination with the brigade support area command post.