ADP-3-19 FIRES Warfighting Function Download

Chapter 3 3-12 ADP 3-19 31 July 2019 for inclusion into a re-prioritized list. The updated DAL then becomes the basis for revised AMD planning and defense design. While the above focuses on planning at the theater level, AMD planning is being performed concurrently at all subordinate echelons of command. Resident ADA personnel, in conjunction with the protection and/or fires cell personnel, consider the echelon’s assets that that commander deems critical and begin to plan protection requirements. Allocated or organic ADA forces are assigned missions in defense of these assets. Adjustments are made to the assignment of forces to an asset or the assets to be defended based on ADA force availability. Additional ADA assets may be requested as required. If active AMD capabilities (shooters) are unavailable, planners consider the use of passive defense measures in lieu thereof. Continuous coordination is conducted by all entities to ensure the protection of critical assets and forces from air and missile attack and surveillance. Integrating surface-to-air capabilities requires extensive preparation and collaboration throughout planning development within the ADA force and with other fires elements. Integration is also a key enabler for managing and sustaining resources. Deconfliction between airspace users, for example, is required to maximize fires potential within an AO. FA, aviation, and ADA personnel must account for airspace control and fire coordination measures in their planning and complementary actions in their operations. PREPARING The ADA commanders assigned to defend designated critical assets at the various Army echelons translate the defense plan into defense designs. They plan integrated defense designs to maximize coverage against projected aerial threats and to execute AMD engagements. Defense considerations include early warning of aerial threats, to trigger passive defense measures by affected units; situational awareness of the airspace in the areas of operations, with respect to both friendly and enemy usage; and active defense (engagements) against surveilling or attacking aerial platforms. Coordination is effected with the supported commander of the fixed/semi-fixed asset or maneuver formation to ensure reciprocal understanding of the availability and use of supporting capabilities and the supported commander’s intent and plans. Collaboration between commanders is also effected in positioning ADA assets in the design of defenses. Responsibilities for “who does what” are inherent in the command or support relationship between the ADA units and the defended assets. ADA sensor and weapon placements are selected to maximize surveillance, tracking, and engagements. In designing a defense, sensors are positioned to provide surveillance and tracking sufficient to protect assigned assets and prevent gaps in the coverage. Sensors are emplaced on terrain that provides the best longest range line-of-sight in all directions. Shooters are then positioned to optimize the defense of the defended assets, enabling lethal coverage over the assigned assets and extending firepower through as much of the defense coverage area as possible. The AMD employment tenets and latest intelligence reports further inform the defense design. Higher altitude, longer range AMD forces may use a weighted defense to counter ballistic missile threats from known locations or areas, or a balanced defense when there is a potential for multiple types of threats coming from various approaches. Because of the nature of their target set, the SHORAD forces may be able to rely more heavily on the tendency of low flying threats to be canalized by terrain due to their flight level and maneuverability. This may allow the SHORAD forces to predict the air avenues of approach for enemy air threats and position forward of the defended asset, weight coverage, and achieve early engagement before the threat is able to reach its ordnance release line. A major consideration in all designs is the establishment of “keep out” areas around the defended assets, where ADA systems are capable of engaging threat aerial platforms or munitions before the threats can launch or create effects on the asset. Active AMD by dedicated ADA units can be augmented by non-dedicated AMD capabilities in maneuver formations. These capabilities, commonly referred to as combined arms for air defense, include organic crew-served weapons and Stinger missiles in some units, to provide an additional layer of AMD, generally for self-defense. A well-executed defense design provides the highest levels of enemy deterrence and asset protection. The longer range and higher altitude ADA systems focus on the defense of the JFC’s priority assets against potential ballistic and cruise missile attacks. These systems may also be assigned to protect the higher